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Part I 
The Crisis as a Crisis of the EU’s 
Identity 
1 
There Is No (Legal) Alternative 
Codifying Economic Ideology into Law 
Benjamin Farrand and Marco Rizzi 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to further explore the nature of ‘crisis’, and how the 
incorporation of an economic ideology as ‘solution’ to that crisis in the form of legally 
binding obligations restricts the ability to pursue alternative courses of action, creating 
tensions within society. Focusing upon economic doctrine as reflecting ideological 
positions, the authors consider the way in which the framing of events as ‘crises’, and 
thereby establishing them as threats to the current political and economic system, 
enables political actors to facilitate changes that may not otherwise be politically 
feasible. In particular, by responding to a crisis through the creation of laws that codify 
an ideologically guided economic doctrine, a temporary state of crisis creates a 
permanent legal set of obligations. By doing so, prevailing (if not altogether hegemonic) 
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political actors are able to delegitimise alternatives to that economic doctrine as falling 
outside of the rule of law: there is no legal alternative but to follow that legal obligation. 
This chapter begins by explaining the theoretical framework guiding the work. It 
draws from a social constructivist perspective, highlighting the importance of ideas as a 
means of interpreting events. It combines analysis of structural economic changes with 
the role of actors in creating and framing narratives surrounding such changes and the 
ensuing struggles. The proposed thesis holds that while structural changes are 
analytically observable, there is no single true narrative of social reality, but instead 
competing and contestable truth claims about the social or political origins of events, 
what those events mean, and whether they constitute a challenge, an opportunity, or a 
problem. It also expands upon how economic ideologies, such as those represented in 
neoclassical economics, reflect ideologically oriented perceptions of the truth of our 
social and economic world. In so doing, instead of rigidly applying analytical tools and 
precepts of social constructivism or Marxism to the events described, the chapter 
adopts a more flexible framework. It builds the theory drawing from tools and precepts 
of both approaches, thereby creating a theoretical hybrid, which is more convincing in 
accounting for the complex variety of factors contributing to the understanding of how 
events can be framed so as to make specific policy choices legally binding – while there 
may be alternative policy options, there is no legal alternative. 
The subsequent section further explores how a ‘crisis’ narrative served to 
structure arguments concerning the nature of the 2008 collapse of key financial 
institutions and the resulting economic fallout, and the appropriate responses to that 
perceived ‘crisis’. In this respect, the existence of crisis is not an objective, immutable 
truth, but instead dependent upon our frames of reference, experiences and 
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understandings of material events. The section also considers the process by which the 
existence of a crisis is framed, communicated and acted upon. The rest of the chapter 
analyses the development of the EU’s economic model. The third section traces this 
development as a response to the perception of systemic economic ‘crisis’ that resulted 
from the identification of serious structural problems with the international financial 
system during the 1970s and the collapse of Bretton Woods. The section then discusses 
the reframing of this crisis as a legitimacy one, resulting from the alleged state capture 
by actors such as trade unions; and through to the rise of monetarism and ‘balanced 
budgets’ as the basis for legal obligations under the Stability and Growth Pact, granted 
further impetus by the Maastricht Treaty. The final section considers the economic 
crash of the mid 2000s, indicating that although this was the result of a myriad of 
different factors, what was arguably a ‘crisis’ of private sector lending practices became 
framed as a crisis of public sector profligacy, with economic ideas concerning 
‘expansionary austerity’ serving as a frame for the reform of the public sector. By the 
codification of this emergency response to a perceived crisis resulting from imbalanced 
budgets and high levels of public debt, a permanent state of austerity becomes codified 
as law, restricting the possibility of attempting alternative economic policies as a means 
of managing structural problems. The chapter concludes by considering the implication 
of this – namely the creation of a new legitimacy crisis, in which the top-down, rule-
making governance style of government becomes discredited. By creating no alternative 
in law, unhappy electorates seek alternatives outside of that legal framework, leading to 
a rise in populist parties, pursuance of referenda as a means of direct democracy, and in 
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the extreme case of the UK’s ‘Brexit’ from the European Union (EU), a desire to leave 
that legal regime altogether.1 
I The Ideas That Shape Our World: a 
Framework for Analysis 
The central thesis of this chapter is that ‘ideas matter’.2 Fundamental assumptions are 
important in understanding how certain concepts become codified in law and therefore 
restrict the policy options of governments. Understanding the contestation between 
competing ideas that seek to explain phenomena (and in so doing, give them meaning) 
is the first essential stage in framing social and political conflict. In this sense the 
approach of this chapter is inspired by a constructivist framework, according to which 
‘people do one thing and not another due to the presence of certain “social constructs”: 
ideas, beliefs, norms, identities or some other interpretive filter through which people 
perceive the world’.3 To put it another way, our interactions with the world, while based 
in direct engagement with material and objective facts, are filtered through social, 
cultural and political processes that serve to shape our understanding of the world 
around us.4 ‘Truth’ in social and political matters, ‘is not a property of the “world out 
                                                          
1 In this context, we refer to the EU’s legal order and membership of it, rather 
than that of the Eurozone, of which the UK is not a member. However, as will be 
discussed later, perceptions of the impact of the Eurozone crisis among UK voters are 
believed to have been one of the determinants of the decision to vote ‘Leave’ in the 
referendum. 
2 A Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (CUP 1999). 
3 C Parsons, ‘Constructivism and Interpretive Theory’ in D Marsh and G Stoker 
(eds), Theory and Methods in Political Science (3rd edn, Palgrave Macmillan 2010) 80. 
4 EG Guba and Yvonna S Lincoln, ‘Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research’ 
in NK Denzin and YS Lincoln (eds), Handbook of Qualitative Research (SAGE 1994) 110; 
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there” but, with the exception of purely analytical statements, is always relative to a 
semantic system’.5 What this means, for the purpose of this chapter, is that while 
structural changes and struggles normally (though not necessarily) linger behind a 
narrative of crisis, the ‘truth’ of it is partial in nature. Different perceptions of the causes 
and solutions to those structural conflicts (including solutions created by legal reform) 
give rise to contestations over what constitutes a crisis, and how best to address it. 
This brings us to the importance of ideas. As Beland and Cox state, we can 
consider ideas to be ‘interpretive frameworks that make us see some facts as important 
and others as less so’.6 They are the beliefs held by individuals or adopted by 
institutions that influence their attitudes and actions.7 Saurugger states that ideas 
influence policymaking in three specific ways: ‘First, they help to construct the 
problems and issues that enter the policy agenda; second, they frame the basic 
assumptions that influence the content of reform proposals; finally, ideas can act as 
discursive tools that shape reform imperatives.’8 Of particular relevance to this chapter 
is the notion that ideas can shape macro-level understandings of the world and how it 
functions, which we can refer to as ideologies. Ideology is in essence an interpretive 
frame, which serves to act as a guide to action. In his discussion of Ideological State 
                                                          
T Christiansen, KE Jorgensen and A Wiener (eds), The Social Construction of Europe 
(SAGE 2001) 3. 
5 F Kratochwil, ‘Constructivism: What It Is (Not) and How It Matters’ in D Della 
Porta and M Keating (eds), Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences: A 
Pluralist Perspective (CUP 2008) 82. 
6 D Beland and RH Cox, ‘Introduction: Ideas and Politics’ in Daniel Beland and 
Robert Henry Cox (eds), Ideas and Politics in Social Science Research (OUP 2010) 3. 
7 L Emmerij, R Jolly and TG Weiss, ‘Economic and Social Thinking at the UN in 
Historical Perspective’ (2005) 36 Development and Change 211, 214. 
8 S Saurugger, ‘Constructivism and Public Policy Approaches in the EU: From 
Ideas to Power Games’ (2013) 20 Journal of European Public Policy 888, 891. 
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Apparatuses (hereafter ISA),9 Althusser argues that ideology refers to the ideology of 
the ruling class, made manifest through private domain actors such as trade unions, 
churches, political parties, the media and the family.10 The analysis conducted by 
Althusser is Marxist in nature, with the ruling class being synonymous with the 
capitalist class, and ideology constituting ‘an imaginary assemblage, a pure dream, 
empty and vain’,11 an imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of 
existence.12 The notion of ISA, and the associated Repressive State Apparatuses (RSA) 
developed within this framework are useful beyond purely Marxist–structuralist 
analysis however, and will be expanded upon with regard to the ideological conditions 
of law. In doing so, we adopt a post-Marxist understanding of ideology as an ideational 
framework supported by a framing narrative that serves as the interpretive lens for 
decision-making. 
In terms of ideas influencing economic policies, the resurgence of ‘neoclassical’ 
economic thought has been particularly important historically in framing 
understandings of the relation between state and market throughout the world, and has 
served as the basis for market reform in numerous contexts, including the Pinochet 
dictatorship in Chile and the economic reforms undertaken in South East Asia during 
the 1980s. The ideas that served as the basis for the economic reforms that have shaped 
the EU, as well as the international trade system, can be traced back to the 
establishment of the Mont Pèlerin Society in 1947, which comprised notable economic 
thinkers such as Milton Friedman, Friedrich Hayek and Ludwig von Mises. For Mirowski 
                                                          
9 A useful concept, which shall be returned to in later sections of this work. 
10 L Althusser, On Ideology (Verso 2008) 17–18. 
11 ibid 34. 
12 ibid 36. 
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and Plehwe, the Mont Pèlerin Society can be considered the birthplace of a Neoliberal 
Thought Collective, or NTC,13 out of which developed the distinct, yet cross-fertilising, 
Austrian legal theory school and the Chicago School of neoclassical economics. While 
German ordoliberalism, already on the rise since the 1930s with roots in authoritarian 
liberalism and in the legal and political discourse of Carl Schmitt,14 is often considered 
to be a distinct form of economic thought, it nevertheless received from this cross-
fertilisation a renewed impetus towards developing its core concept of a preordained 
social market economy.15 What these schools have in common is a focus upon a small-
state, market economy. In this schema, the state would not act as the libertarian ‘night 
watchman’, there to preserve private property rights and to protect from foreign 
invaders, but instead would act as a coercive entity, there to ensure the function of, and 
indeed removal of barriers to, market activity. The NTC, while not a formal institution, 
nevertheless constituted an epistemic community,16 with similar learned experiences 
and understandings of how economies function. Through the establishment of these 
informal links, individuals with shared economic views increasingly became seen as the 
economic mainstream and were successful in gaining positions in academic institutions 
such as the University of Chicago, as well as in think tanks relied upon by leaders such 
                                                          
13 P Mirowski and D Plehwe (eds), The Road from Mont Pèlerin the Making of the 
Neoliberal Thought Collective (Harvard UP 2009); P Mirowski, Never Let a Serious 
Crisis Go to Waste: How Neoliberalism Survived the Financial Meltdown (Verso 2014) 
38. 
14 See for example L Vinx, ‘Carl Schmitt and the Problem of Constitutional 
Guardianship’ in M Arvidsson, L Brännström and P Minkkinen (eds), The Contemporary 
Relevance of Carl Schmitt – Law, Politics, Theology (Routledge 2016); R Cristi, Carl 
Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism (University of Wales Press 1998). 
15 Mirowski (n 13) 42. 
16 On this point, see PM Haas, ‘Introduction: Epistemic Communities and 
International Policy Coordination’ (1992) 46 International Organization 1. 
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as Prime Minister Thatcher and President Reagan, namely the Institute of Economic 
Affairs in the UK and the Heritage Foundation in the US. Both of these think tanks 
espoused conservative, classical economic ‘solutions’ to the range of crisis ‘problems’, 
from labour relations to trade between nations, creating the conditions for the existing 
ideological frame; namely, that it was not the role of the state to coordinate or plan 
markets, to be successfully contested, but to create the minimum conditions necessary 
for free markets to operate, with minimal state interference.17 Friedman in particular 
served as adviser to both Thatcher and Reagan, and Hayek’s Road to Serfdom was 
highly influential on Thatcher in particular. Thatcher stated that it was ‘the most 
powerful critique of socialist planning and the socialist state which I read at this time 
[the late 1940s], and to which I have returned so often’.18 In this respect, it is important 
to think of the new wave of economic liberalism, encompassing both neoliberalism and 
the variant of ordoliberalism, not as an ideology of state reduction, but of state 
transformation. 
Within this framework, the role of the state is to support and regulate the 
margins of market activity. It is not to intervene in the running of markets, but instead 
to facilitate it. In neoliberalism, this is done through the ‘maximisation of 
entrepreneurial freedoms within an institutional framework characterised by private 
property rights . . . the role of the State is to create and preserve an institutional 
                                                          
17 V Tanzi, Government versus Markets: The Changing Economic Role of the State 
(CUP 2014) 134; K Birch and A Tickell, ‘Making Neoliberal Order in the United States’ in 
Kean Birch and Vlad Mykhnenko (eds), The Rise and Fall of Neoliberalism: The Collapse 
of an Economic Order? (Zed Books 2010) 4–5. 
18 R Bourne, ‘Hayek and Thatcher’ (Centre for Policy Studies, 11 September 
2012) <www.cps.org.uk/blog/q/date/2012/09/11/hayek-and-thatcher>. 
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framework appropriate to such practices’.19 However, some authors have argued that 
the rise of ‘so-called’ neoliberal thought has led to an increase in the number of 
regulatory agencies, and an increase in regulation reflective of a form of regulatory 
capitalism,20 and that it is therefore wrong to describe this as neoliberalism. In 
comparison, Cahill argues that we can refer to ‘actually existing neoliberalism’, which 
separates a laissez-faire economic doctrine in theory from a top-down managerial form 
of capitalism in practice.21 Mirowski disagrees, arguing that the NTC reflected by 
Friedman in particular never ascribed to laissez-faire, and instead saw a role for the 
state.22 In this respect, neoliberalism closely mirrors its cousin ordoliberalism, insofar 
as they both consider the state to have an interventionist role to facilitate market 
practices based on principles of competition. A different stream of literature, focused on 
‘statecraft’, reaches similar conclusions. It identifies the current evolution of the state as 
the ‘market state’, which replaces the previous ‘nation state’. While the essential role of 
the latter was welfare provision to the nation, the emerging market state is strategically 
focused on maximising economic opportunities for market agents, guaranteeing the 
basic strategic market infrastructure without unduly interfering with economic 
competition.23 The success of this new wave of liberal economic thinking has steadily 
                                                          
19 D Harvey, ‘Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction’ (2007) 610 ANNALS of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 21, 22. 
20 See for example D Levi-Faur, ‘The Rise of Regulatory Capitalism: The Global 
Diffusion of a New Order’ (2005) 598 ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science 12; J Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism: How It Works, Ideas for Making 
It Work Better (Edward Elgar 2008). 
21 D Cahill, The End of Laissez-Faire?: On the Durability of Embedded 
Neoliberalism (Edward Elgar 2015). 
22 Mirowski and Plehwe (n 13). 
23 P Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles – War, Peace and the Course of History (Knopf 
2002) 229: ‘[s]uch a State depends on the international capital markets and, to a lesser 
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developed in the last thirty years. Its hegemonic status is an expression of the accepted 
common sense of both state-level policymaking, as well as general public perception. As 
Monbiot has claimed, ‘we’re all neoliberals now’.24 
II Never Let a Good Crisis Go to Waste: 
Conceptualisation, Recognition and 
Facilitation 
Since 2008, many authors writing in the diverse fields of European Union studies have 
referred to the existence of a ‘crisis’. Writing in a recent edited volume, legal scholars 
Chalmers, Jachtenfuchs and Joerges refer to the Eurocrisis as the ‘most severe crisis in 
the history of the EU’.25 Similarly, the prominent philosopher and sociologist Habermas 
has written that ‘in the current crisis, it is often asked why we should continue to cling 
to the European Union at all’.26 Political scientist Majone indeed titled a book Rethinking 
                                                          
degree, on the modern multinational business network to create stability in the world 
economy, in preference to management by national or transnational political bodies . . . 
Whereas the nation-state justified itself as an instrument to serve the welfare of the 
people (the nation), the market-state exists to maximize the opportunities enjoyed by 
all members of society’; and, expanding on its defining characteristics, ‘the market state 
is largely indifferent to the norms of justice, or for that matter to any particular set of 
moral values so long as law does not act as an impediment to economic competition’ (p 
230). 
24 G Monbiot, ‘Neoliberalism – the Ideology at the Root of All Our Problems’ The 
Guardian (15 April 2016) 
<www.theguardian.com/books/2016/apr/15/neoliberalism-ideology-problem-
george-monbiot>; see also D Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (OUP 2007) on 
neoliberal hegemony. 
25 D Chalmers, M Jachtenfuchs and C Joerges, ‘The Retransformation of Europe’ in 
Damian Chalmers, M Jachtenfuchs and C Joerges (eds), The End of the Eurocrats’ Dream: 
Adjusting to European Diversity (CUP 2016) 1. 
26 J Habermas, The Crisis of the European Union: A Response (Polity 2013) 1. 
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the Union of Europe Post-Crisis.27 Such statements are not relegated to the academic 
sphere, however; one only needs to refer to policy documents published by the 
European Commission in the past eight years to see the term ‘crisis’ being used 
repeatedly, whether in light of a new policy agenda, known as Europe 2020, in which 
‘the crisis is a wake-up call, the moment where we recognise that “business as usual” 
would consign us to a gradual decline’,28 or in the context of reforming copyright laws in 
the digital environment, deemed essential to ensuring the EU’s recovery from financial 
‘crisis’.29 In discussions on the current direction, policies and challenges of the EU, the 
existence of ‘crisis’ is presupposed, constituting the material state in which the 
organisation finds itself. 
Yet what is a ‘crisis’, and how are we cognisant of the ‘fact’ that one exists? 
Posing such a question may appear facetious – after all, is it not obvious that we are 
experiencing one? Whether we focus upon the negative humanitarian consequences of 
austerity-based politics in Greece,30 Spain31 and Portugal,32 or the plight of Syrian 
                                                          
27 G Majone, Rethinking the Union of Europe Post-Crisis: Has Integration Gone 
Too Far? (CUP 2014). 
28 European Commission, ‘Europe 2020: A Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and 
Inclusive Growth’ (2010) COM(2010) 2020 final 2. 
29 European Commission, ‘A Digital Agenda for Europe’ (2010) COM(2010) 245 
final/2 2. 
30 V Ioakimidis and DD Teloni, ‘Greek Social Work and the Never-Ending Crisis of 
the Welfare State’ (2013) 1 Critical and Radical Social Work 31. 
31 M Gili and others, ‘The Mental Health Risks of Economic Crisis in Spain: 
Evidence from Primary Care Centres, 2006 and 2010' (2013) 23 European Journal of 
Public Health 103. 
32 D Cairns, K Growiec and N de Almeida Alves, ‘Another “Missing Middle”? The 
Marginalised Majority of Tertiary-Educated Youth in Portugal during the Economic 
Crisis’ (2014) 17 Journal of Youth Studies 1046. 
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refugees and their subsequent treatment in countries such as Hungary,33 is the 
existence of crises not evident? ‘Crisis’, it is submitted, is not an impartial and objective 
assessment of an exogenous phenomenon, an observation of a material fact in the 
physical realm. While structural changes are analytically observable, they are not in 
themselves a crisis. A ‘crisis’ is not an objective fact. Rather, it is contextual and 
relational. It is contextual insofar as the circumstances in which the event occurs serve 
to give it meaning. It is also relational, insofar as our prior knowledge, experiences and 
understandings serve as an interpretive lens, making sense of the material event, and in 
turn causing us to identify it as a crisis. In order to better understand this, an example 
may prove useful. Let us take the example of narratives concerning crime. A person 
taking property that belongs to another is a physical, material act that can be observed. 
This is an act constituting theft, a crime. But a material fact, one person stealing from 
another, does not in itself constitute a crisis. Whether it constitutes a crisis is a 
contextual, relational assessment based on its conceptual construction. Crime was 
historically not a political issue, but an observable part of life. This appeared to change 
in the 1970s in the US, when crime began to be discussed in terms of crisis, plague and 
terror.34 An observed phenomenon, an apparent increase in crime rates, was 
conceptually constructed as a crisis, necessitating an urgent political response. While 
other countries also observed an increase in crime rates at a similar point in time, they 
                                                          
33 A Kallius, D Monterescu and P Kumar Rajaram, ‘Immobilizing Mobility: Border 
Ethnography, Illiberal Democracy, and the Politics of the “Refugee Crisis” in Hungary’ 
(2016) 43 American Ethnologist 25. 
34 See for example BI Page and RY Shapiro, The Rational Public: Fifty Years of 
Trends in Americans’ Policy Preferences (University of Chicago Press 1992); S Iyengar, 
Is Anyone Responsible?: How Television Frames Political Issues (University of Chicago 
Press 1991); D Gardner, Risk: The Science and Politics of Fear (Virgin Books 2008). 
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did not frame the phenomenon in terms of ‘crisis’.35 Furthermore, even where a crisis is 
perceived to exist, the causes of, and indeed solutions to that crisis are ultimately 
interpreted and, then communicated, in terms of the underlying ideological position of 
the actors constructing the narrative. For example, in the dominant narratives in the US 
and UK, the causes of crime (and subsequently, crime-related crises) are ultimately 
related to individual moral failings, the breakdown of social relations and undesirable 
elements in society.36 In comparison, in Scandinavia, crime at that point in time was 
considered to result from collective social failure, relating to socio-economic inequality 
or lack of opportunities.37 Solutions also differed – whereas countries like the US and UK 
adopted penal policies based strongly upon performative punishment, often with zero 
tolerance policies and harsh prison sentences,38 countries such as Norway and Sweden 
focused upon rehabilitative policies, with more lenient prison sentences (or, indeed, 
alternatives to imprisonment), and the reintegration of offenders into society. Ideology 
plays a part in this identification, both of crisis and the appropriate responses to it – in 
the late 1970s, both the US and UK were heavily influenced by more conservative 
political philosophies, within a liberal framework of personal responsibility and 
individualism, where individuals should be punished for their failings.39 Scandinavian 
countries, in comparison, were largely dominated by centre-left parties based on 
                                                          
35 See for example L Zedner, ‘In Pursuit of the Vernacular: Comparing Law and 
Order Discourse in Britain and Germany’ (1995) 4 Social & Legal Studies 517. 
36 D Garland, ‘The Culture of High Crime Societies’ (2000) 40 British Journal of 
Criminology 347. 
37 F Estrada, ‘The Transformation of the Politics of Crime in High Crime Societies’ 
(2004) 1 European Journal of Criminology 419. 
38 K Beckett, Making Crime Pay: Law and Order in Contemporary American 
Politics (OUP 1999); 
39 Estrada (n 37); Garland (n 36). 
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socialist principles and social belonging, with policies instead focused on rehabilitation 
and reintegration.40 
It is also important to consider how an event or phenomenon becomes 
understood as constituting a ‘crisis’. A crisis is discursively constructed, or as Hay states, 
‘constituted in and through narrative’.41 It is subjectively perceived42 as ‘a social event, 
and therefore is always socially constructed and highly political’.43 What is, and indeed, 
what is not a crisis is ultimately determined by the ability of well-placed actors, whether 
in politics or the media, to successfully identify and communicate the existence of a 
crisis to their target audience(s). The ability to do so is linked to the dominant 
ideologies and discourses – those arguments and framings that are coherent within the 
larger ideological framework dominant in society at that time may be more able to be 
effectively communicated and accepted by the target audience.44 Referring to the 
previous example, where the dominant discourses concerning the way society functions 
are based in ideas of individualism, self-reliance and personal responsibility, discourses 
concerning crime tend to be based in ideas of individual fault and personal failing 
necessitating punishment. Alternatively, where society is understood as a collective 
endeavour with shared responsibility, rehabilitation may be favoured over harsh prison 
terms, and public discourse focuses on social causes of crime. In attempting to 
                                                          
40 H Von Hofer, ‘Crime and Reactions to Crime in Scandinavia’ (2005) 5 Journal of 
Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention 148; T Lappi-Seppälä, ‘Penal 
Policy in Scandinavia’ (2007) 36 Crime and Justice 217. 
41 C Hay, ‘Narrating Crisis: The Discursive Construction of the “Winter of 
Discontent”’ (1996) 30 Sociology 253, 254. 
42 ibid 255. 
43 A Gamble, The Spectre at the Feast: Capitalist Crisis and the Politics of 
Recession (Palgrave Macmillan 2009) 38. 
44 J Mehta, ‘The Varied Roles of Ideas in Politics’ in Daniel Beland and Robert 
Henry Cox (eds), Ideas and Politics in Social Science Research (OUP 2010). 
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understand whether there is a crisis, and if so, what its root causes are, there may be 
competing ideas represented, with different narratives competing for public acceptance 
so as to discursively control understanding of that event. As Hay puts it, narratives of 
crisis ‘compete in terms of their ability to find resonance with individual and collective 
direct, lived experiences, and not in terms of their “scientific” adequacy as explanations 
for the condition they diagnose’.45 Hay provides the example of the construction of the 
‘Winter of Discontent’, during which the tabloid media successfully framed the strikes of 
workers over pay and conditions in 1970s Britain using emotive terms of crisis, with the 
state being brought to a standstill by selfish actors holding the state to ransom, refusing 
to bury the dead, collect garbage, allow access to hospitals by patients, or unload food 
held in storage containers at ports in Liverpool.46 Similarly, in the US in the 1980s, 
actors were able to frame job losses and recession combined with an ageing population 
as constituting a Social Security crisis in which excessive benefit payments and welfare 
provision to those not deemed to have ‘paid in’ to the system, rather than as ‘a 
consequence of the failure of fiscal and monetary policies’ enacted by successive 
governments.47 Media discourses and the acts and statements of high-profile political 
actors can in turn shape understanding of events, constructing narratives within 
ideological frames with guideposts for knowledge, persuasion and action.48 
                                                          
45 Hay (n 41) 255. 
46 ibid 261. 
47 Carroll L Estes, ‘Social Security: The Social Construction of a Crisis’ 61 Milbank 
Memorial Fund Quarterly: Health and Society 445, 447–48. 
48 See generally DA Schön and M Rein, Frame Reflection: Toward the Resolution 
of Intractable Policy Controversies: Toward the Resolution of Intractable Policy 
Controversies (Basic Books 1995); VA Schmidt, ‘Speaking to the Markets or to the 
People? A Discursive Institutionalist Analysis of the EU’s Sovereign Debt Crisis’ (2014) 
16 British Journal of Politics & International Relations 188. 
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Yet just because one actor claims that something is a crisis does not make it one: 
the construction of a narrative of crisis is a process. In this respect, drawing from the 
literature on securitisation in international relations can be useful. The framing of an 
issue as being one which constitutes a security threat is a process, in which a subject, 
such as ‘crime’, or ‘immigration’ is discussed in terms of a security issue. This issue then 
necessitates a security response in the form of an immediate and exceptional act. 
However, this cannot be achieved without convincing a target audience, generally 
considered to be the general public, or policymakers with the ability to accept, 
legitimise or legislate for this exceptional response.49 Through studying these processes 
of framing, communication and acceptance, we can then better understand how security 
can be used as a concept ‘invoked to legitimise contentious legislation, policies or 
practices that would otherwise not have been deemed legitimate’.50 Securitisation is the 
process by which something is constructed as a security threat necessitating a policy 
response.51 As stated by Buzan et al., through this process, the issue being interpreted 
by observers ‘becomes a security issue – not necessarily because a real existential threat 
exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat’.52 The issue, be it an attack 
committed by a terrorist organisation, or even the mere existence of that group at all, is 
securitised through the use of security-framed language, ‘as an existential threat, 
                                                          
49 B Buzan, O Waever and J de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis 
(Lynne Rienner Publishers 1997) 41. 
50 AW Neal, ‘Securitization and Risk at the EU Border: The Origins of FRONTEX’ 
(2009) 47 Journal of Common Market Studies 333, 335. 
51 See for example J Eriksson, ‘Observers or Advocates? On the Political Role of 
Security Analysts’ (1999) 34 Cooperation and Conflict 311; J Huysmans, ‘Defining Social 
Constructivism in Security Studies: The Normative Dilemma of Writing Security’ (2002) 
27 Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 41. 
52 Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (n 49) 24. 
17 
 
requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of 
political procedure’.53 Key dimensions of securitisation are urgency and exceptionality; 
something poses an imminent security threat, thereby requiring an exceptional 
response to counter that security threat, something that must be accepted as ‘true’ by 
the target audience in order for it to be considered as having been securitised.54 It is 
submitted that the process by which an event, issue or phenomenon is identified, 
communicated and accepted as constituting a crisis is analogous with that of 
securitisation. This process can be considered as one of conceptualisation, 
communication and facilitation. The first stage, conceptualisation, involves the 
identification of an event or phenomena as constituting a ‘crisis’ event. The ideological 
stance of the observer helps to frame that event, identifying what it is about it that 
creates a crisis, and why. Once the crisis has been conceptualised, the observer must 
then communicate the existence of a crisis necessitating an immediate and exceptional 
response in order to counter, combat or recover from that crisis event, with the 
acceptance of this narrative by the target audience. Another way of putting this is the 
idea that the crisis creates such uncertainty or instability that extreme measures must 
be taken; it may not be pleasant, but ‘There Is No Alternative’. This is akin to the 
securitising act in securitisation theory, by which, through discursive appeal, the event 
is communicated to an audience as a means to persuade them that action is necessary. 
The final stage is that of facilitation; once the event has been accepted as constituting a 
‘crisis’ necessitating an urgent, exceptional response, that exceptional action can be 
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legitimised, allowing for policies, decisions, or laws to be instigated that would not 
normally be considered acceptable or possible. 
A practical example borrowed from global health governance can illustrate the 
transferability of this model. In the summer of 2009, the WHO officially declared a state 
of global pandemic55 following the outbreak of a new strain of A-N1H1 virus, better 
known as ‘swine flu’.56 The outbreak started in Central America, in the state of Veracruz 
in Mexico, and spread globally, prompting a conceptualisation of a state of global health 
crisis by official governmental authorities. The ensuing increasing anxiety of the 
international community led to a generalised outcry advocating the adoption of 
extraordinary measures to avert a potential global health disaster – the recognition 
phase. As a result, massive quantities of A-N1H1 influenza vaccine, subject to ‘fast-track’ 
emergency approval procedures, were swiftly made available by regulatory agencies. In 
order to ensure the supply of the vaccine to soothe public opinion, states discharged 
companies from tort liability in case of damages,57 and assumed full responsibility for 
the risks created by the widespread distribution of a not-thoroughly-tested vaccine in 
their communities – the facilitation phase. Yet, the following winter (2009–10), the 
pandemic gradually started to diminish, and by August 2010, the Director-General of 
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the WHO, Dr Margaret Chan, declared the end of the A-N1H1 pandemic.58 The pandemic 
could have been much worse, or arguably should have been much worse, in light of the 
level of alert and social anxiety triggered by the ‘crisis’ narrative. In the space of one 
year, the A-N1H1 virus had killed approximately 18,000 people globally.59 That is about 
4 per cent of the 250,000 to 500,000 annual deaths caused by ‘regular’ influenza.60 
Questions were thus raised about the necessity of states investing billions in the 
purchase of enormous quantities of a vaccine, the safety and efficacy of which was far 
from certain. Then, quietly and smoothly, this story slowed down and disappeared. 
Within the dominant ideology of western liberal democracy and the system of 
capitalism fostered within it, we have a plethora of examples of the ways that crisis has 
been facilitative of actions or policies that might not ordinarily be accepted. From 
Klein’s analysis of the ‘shock doctrine’, in which natural disasters such as Hurricane 
Katrina, wars as in Iraq and acts of terror serve to open up new ‘markets’ to significant 
economic reform along neoliberal lines,61 to Lowenstein’s work on ‘disaster capitalism’, 
where the provision of nominally state functions are privatised as a response to a 
perceived crisis, be it the existence of large numbers of refugees to be ‘resettled’ off the 
Australian coast or the housing of asylum seekers in the UK (and the ‘cost to the 
taxpayer’ that this would entail),62 the successful construction of a crisis narrative 
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allows for the enactment of policies it may otherwise be difficult to legitimise. 
Furthermore, by using this opportunity to make an idea legally binding, the question of 
solutions is changed from a political one to a legal one – what is legally permitted as a 
response to a crisis, and what is legally prohibited? Law can therefore be used to 
depoliticise a particular issue, taking it out of the venue of political debate and 
discourse, and moving it into the realm of technical rule-making and application. By 
using ideas ‘as weapons’,63 contesting ideas, and in the context of this chapter, economic 
ideologies can therefore be depoliticised and, ultimately, delegitimised; through the use 
of the legal system, it can then be ensured that There Is No (Legal) Alternative. Yet, this 
is not the end of political contestation, which can hardly ever come to a definitive halt. 
Instead, by normatively excluding the possibility of change from the constitutional 
order, one runs the risk of destabilising that order altogether, as the legal responses and 
constraints facilitated by these discourses serve to delegitimise those legal frameworks. 
If, as these arguments run, there is no legal alternative within the existing system of 
governance, opponents to that system will instead argue for the dissolution or 
disengagement from that system, as we shall further explore in considering the UK’s 
decision to withdraw from the EU, as well as the rise of anti-EU rhetoric in political 
campaigning. 
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III From Bretton Woods to Maastricht: 
Monetarism as Ideology, Monetarism as Law 
It is possible to reconceptualise the development of the EEC, and now the EU, in terms 
of integration as a response to perceived crisis, and crisis as a facilitator of change. The 
1970s was a period of significant political–economic upheaval. Since the end of the 
Second World War, many industrialised nations not part of the Soviet Union were party 
to the Bretton Woods Agreement, which was initially negotiated between the Allied 
powers in 1944, and which Germany gained membership of after the war was over. 
Bretton Woods formalised a monetary policy in which the US dollar was ‘equated’ with 
gold,64 and national currencies pegged to the value of the US dollar as a means of 
ensuring international currency stability.65 The key objective of the Bretton Woods 
Agreement, according to Ruggie, was to create an international economic order based 
on embedded liberalism,66 in which a compromise was established, ensuring free-
flowing trade between states while allowing nation states to intervene in their domestic 
economies to mitigate the impact of that trade. This domestic intervention was 
Keynesian in nature,67 itself based on an internal compromise between the perceived 
interests of labour and capital; a corporatist model involving state planning, 
administrative bureaucratisation and corporate management on the basis of increasing 
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productivity with social welfare provision and collective bargaining.68 In this system, 
trade unions, in particular, played an important role, cooperating in the management of 
wages in response to economic fluctuations.69 Within this framework, the state was the 
dirigiste state,70 responsible for guiding, shaping and managing the economy.71 During 
this period, beginning in the early 1950s and ending in the 1970s, impressive growth 
rates in the US, Europe and Japan led to this compromise being tolerated by corporate 
entities, if not welcomed with entirely open arms. 
At this time, according to Mirowski, the Mont Pèlerin Society members were 
something of a downbeat and disenfranchised group, relegated to the sidelines of 
economic thinking as a result of their support for free market solutions to the Great 
Depression and the subsequent rise of Keynesian interventionist policies.72 Those 
classical liberal economic ideas, which the Mont Pèlerin economists claimed to adhere 
to, were ones in which the international financial system was underwritten by a system 
based on an international gold standard. States could use the gold standard as a basis 
for the valuing of their currencies, but this also allowed for currency depreciation and 
‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ economic strategies. Undermined by their apparent 
ineffectiveness during the early 1930s, the failing of these classical economic ideas 
resulted in a legitimacy crisis of the old order. Their ineffectiveness, which, as Judt 
argues, ‘seemed to Americans especially to be the root source of the European (and 
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world) crisis’,73 in particular allowed for the contestation of dominant economic 
ideologies, resulting in the shift from a classical economic model to a Keynesian one. In 
other words, the Bretton Woods Agreement, and the domestic economic policies that 
followed, were based in a post-war consensus, with ‘the centre of gravity of political 
argument in the years after 1945 [lying] not between left and right but rather within the 
left: between communists and their sympathisers and the mainstream liberal–social–
democratic consensus’.74 The dominant discourse of political economy, the idea shaping 
economic conduct, was that of liberal interventionism. The role of states was to 
intervene in markets so as to ensure their continued functioning for the achievement of 
public policy goals such as social stability. Economics and politics were intertwined, and 
co-dependent. 
By the 1970s, however, perceptions had shifted substantially. The war in 
Vietnam, combined with a rapidly growing US federal budget deficit, were seen as no 
less disastrous for the US economy due to an outflow of US dollars that exceeded the 
amount of gold possessed by the US.75 Concerns over a possible recession in the US and 
international speculation against the dollar resulted in President Nixon unilaterally 
devaluing the currency, cutting its link to the value of gold, effectively breaking up the 
Bretton Woods system.76 This collapse, both in Bretton Woods specifically, as well as in 
confidence in the system of international trade with a fixed currency exchange, resulted 
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in the UK devaluing its currency in 1972, followed by France in 1973, and the 
establishment of a new floating-rate system; the cost of this, ultimately, was inflation.77 
The ‘Oil Shock’ of 1973, a consequence of an embargo imposed by the Organisation of 
Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries, resulted in the cost of oil quadrupling. The 
inaccessibility of these energy supplies resulted in drops in industrial output in affected 
countries, lowering gross domestic product (GDP). This combination of low-to-nil 
economic growth (stagnation) with the inflation caused by the collapse of Bretton 
Woods led to a phenomenon referred to as stagflation, defined by Blyth as a situation in 
which ‘wages/prices (inflation) and unemployment rose together’.78 The Keynesian 
consensus broke down. Economic instability allowed for contesting voices to emerge, 
raising economic arguments considered fringe until then, claiming that the events being 
witnessed constituted a major structural and systemic crisis within Keynesian 
economics. The resolution of this crisis, these voices argued, must be found outside the 
Keynesian orthodoxy, which had rapidly become discredited.79 This was, in part, 
because events ‘seemed to show that unemployment and inflation could coexist, which 
was extremely unlikely in Keynesian theory’.80 The ideas of the Mont Pèlerin Society, 
previously at the margins of policymaking, became newly influential as policymakers 
and sought alternatives to the Keynesian model. 
How did this progressive shift impact Europe? Originally, the Treaty of Rome 
establishing the European Economic Community and its relevant institutions such as 
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the European Court of Justice, laid down the prohibition on tariffs, quantitative 
restrictions and national measures ‘having equivalent effect’ on trade, with a 
transitional period ending 1 January 1970.81 Despite this general framework, however, 
economic policies were national in nature, based on the Keynesian compromise 
between the socialist state and capitalist production.82 Within this framework, 
regulation was an issue of national, and indeed state public policy; for Laffont, 
regulation in this model was ‘the public economics face of industrial organisation. It 
explored the various ways in which governments interfere with industrial activities for 
the good or for the bad’.83 This is the golden age of what Ogus refers to as ‘command-
and-control’ regulation, laid down and enforced exclusively by the state.84 Distinct from 
the discourse of neoliberalism, in which the ‘interference’ of the state in market 
activities could always be considered bad, this was not a given under Keynesian policies. 
For the EEC states in particular, the US and Japan were perceived as having weathered 
the turbulence of the mid 1970s much more effectively.85 This was considered to be the 
result of both the US and Japan representing unified state entities, whereas the EEC was 
characterised by national divergences in preferences and policies, resulting in the often-
cited ‘Eurosclerosis’ typifying this period of European integration.86 
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The Trilateral Commission, a non-governmental think tank established in 1973 
by David Rockefeller, issued a report in 1975 that was significantly influential in 
changing the understandings of the EEC Member States regarding economic policy. The 
title of the report is indicative of its findings, referring as it does to ‘the crisis of 
democracy’.87 Europe was considered increasingly ungovernable due to an ‘overload’ of 
participants with conflicting demands, and being overly bureaucratic88- the task was 
now to replace its corporatist models with ‘more flexible models that could produce 
more social control with less coercive pressure’.89 To do so, it would be necessary to 
relocate responsibilities away from states, and towards markets.90 By framing the 
events of the 1970s as the result of a crisis of democracy, and indeed a legitimacy crisis 
in which the old model was discredited and a new model needed, these phenomena 
could be conceptualised as crisis-inducing, recognised by policymakers as a problem in 
need of a solution, facilitating significant ideational and policy change. 
In Europe, this restructuring along market lines began with the actions of the 
European Court of Justice, through its case law implementing the free movement of 
goods and services, and the removal of state barriers to trade, and facilitation of both 
mutual recognition and inter-state competition.91 It is for this reason that some 
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commentators have argued that the Court has been a ‘neoliberal’ actor,92 enshrining (or, 
as Weiler puts it, constitutionalising)93 the logic of market-based solutions and 
economic reasoning into the EU legal order.94 This approach was not restricted to the 
negative integration of the Court, however, but extended into the rationale of positive 
integration through market re-regulation taken by the European Commission and 
Council.95 Furthermore the European Council, originally an informal meeting of the 
heads of state of EEC countries, was influential in the development of a European 
Monetary System during its summits in 1978 in Copenhagen, Bremen and Brussels.96 
The Trilateral Commission’s report identifying the roots of crisis in an overabundance 
of democracy facilitated a situation in which the states party to the EEC could make 
their voices more effectively heard. Ostensibly intended as a means of coordinating 
their international response to pressing issues,97 this resulted in their inclusion as a 
formal institution within the European organisational structure, referenced in the Single 
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European Act and included formally as an EU institution in the Treaty of Lisbon. Indeed, 
according to Mourlon-Druol, of the issues discussed by the European Council between 
1975 and 1986, macroeconomic policy was the most common.98 The election of 
Margaret Thatcher in 1979, and her ‘there is no alternative’ approach to economic 
reform, combined with the Mitterrand reforms in 1983, was considered to be the point 
at which the conditions for broader financial liberalisation in the European Community 
were set.99 
The continuing codification of an economic ideology as legally binding 
obligations was given impetus by the 1985 European Council summit in Milan. 
According to the European Council conclusions, measures that should be pursued by the 
Community included the liberalisation of capital movements, the creation of a free 
market for financial services and the continuing removal of barriers to trade.100 In the 
Commission’s ‘White Paper: Completing the Internal Market’ published subsequently to 
the Milan summit, it was stated that actions should be taken to create ‘a more 
favourable environment for stimulating enterprise, competition and trade’.101 
Demonstrating the impact on policymakers represented by the ideational shift from 
Keynesianism to neoclassical/neoliberal thought, the Commission concluded that ‘a well 
developed free trade area offers significant advantages: it is something much better 
than that which existed before the Treaty of Rome’.102 The resulting Single European 
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Act, signed in Luxembourg in 1986, facilitated the liberalisation of financial services 
desired by the European Council members, ‘altering the systemic relationships that 
govern monetary policy making’,103 empowering central banks by making them 
independent from governments. The goal was to ensure that ‘irresponsible’ 
governments could not abuse fiscal policy, reflected in increases in public debt: 
‘identified as the source of economic problems . . . the remedies were identified in the 
realm of monetary policy’.104 These actions served to separate the discursive links 
between politics and economics, with economic activity considered a largely 
technocratic or expert-led exercise, in which undue political influence could result in 
inefficiencies or distortions of that distinct sphere of activity. 
The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU was the next step in preventing the 
future likelihood of this ‘problem’ (regarded as being responsible for the crises of the 
1970s), codifying economic ideology concerning monetary policies into legally binding 
obligations. The Delors Report, named after Commission President Jacques Delors, 
published in 1989, linked the idea of EMU as functionally linked to the internal market, 
and indeed necessary for its completion. Indeed, a report issued the following year, 
entitled ‘One Market, One Money’ made the case that ‘if the move to EMU were not to 
take place . . . capital market liberalisation would not be achieved or maintained’.105 The 
Delors Report regarded the economic shocks of the 1970s as damaging to the process of 
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European integration.106 EMU, characterised by the free movement of capital, locked 
exchange rates and a single currency, would help to prevent these shocks in the future, 
it was reasoned, as it would prevent market manipulation and currency wars between 
the Member States. However, as McNamara argues, the implementation of EMU through 
the Maastricht Treaty represented the realisation of a neoliberal consensus, namely that 
the goal of economic coordination was to achieve anti-inflationary monetary policies 
and the limitation of public spending deficits,107 discouraging state intervention in 
market activity not only politically, but legally. 
Mann refers to this process at the EU level as being the constitutionalisation of 
economic doctrine through rules-based approaches to monetary policy, strictly limiting 
governmental discretion, providing the example of the EU’s ‘aggressive’ price stability 
requirements.108 The economic shocks of the 1970s, perceived as a crisis caused by 
stagflation (i.e. lack of growth combined with inflation) resulted in a collapse of market 
confidence, and indeed, a collapse of confidence in Keynesian economics. A distrust of 
‘big government’, related to Nixon’s domestic spending, resulted in the ‘solution’ to the 
crisis: reining in public spending as a means of combating inflation. Indeed, in a Council 
Regulation known as the Stability and Growth Pact,109 (SGP) the very first recital states 
that the SGP is based on ‘the objective of sound government finances as a means of 
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strengthening the conditions for price stability and for strong sustainable growth 
conducive to employment creation’. This was then codified in the Lisbon Treaty, with 
the consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union stating in Article 3(3) that 
one of its core objectives is the sustainable development of Europe through ‘balanced 
economic growth and price stability’, with the effect of ‘locking-in political 
commitments to orthodox market–monetarist fiscal and monetary policies that are 
perceived to increase government credibility in the eyes of financial market players’.110 
In this system, referred to by Gill as ‘disciplinary neoliberalism’,111 even should EU 
Member States wish to pursue alternate economic policies or goals, there is no legal 
alternative. 
IV A New Crisis, A New Challenge: When 
There Is No Legal Alternative, Brexit Stage 
Left? 
The global financial crisis of the mid 2000s is perceived to have begun with the collapse 
of the subprime mortgage market: economically vulnerable homeowners, who had been 
granted loans despite dubious creditworthiness, struggled to make their monthly 
repayments as a result of higher interest rates and falling property prices.112 However, 
as Blyth astutely points out, numerous different academic explanations of what 
happened, and who is to blame, have been given. 
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The crisis is both overexplained and overdetermined . . . for 
example, three excellent books on the crisis stress, respectively, 
increasing income inequality . . . the captured nature of financial 
regulation, and the political power of finance. Each book certainly 
captures an important aspect of the crisis. But are these factors absolutely 
necessary to adequately explain it?113 
That the systemic spread of financial instability, resulting in the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers in the US and the revelations of significantly overleveraged European 
banking institutions loaded with ‘junk’ debt, was perceived as a ‘crisis’ internationally is 
both clear and indisputable. In addition to the statements of leading EU officials 
mentioned earlier in this chapter, figures such as the then US presidential candidate 
Barack Obama declared that ‘the economic crisis we face is the worst since the Great 
Depression’.114 Similarly, Ben Bernanke stated in 2009 that ‘the current crisis has been 
one of the most difficult financial and economic episodes in modern history’.115 What is 
clear, however, is that the crisis had its origins in the practices of private sector 
institutions.116 As Beck states with regard to the perception of the crisis in Europe 
however, the surface view of policymakers has been that it instead ‘revolves around 
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debts, budget deficits and problems of finance’.117 For Angela Merkel in particular, the 
crisis was the result of ‘cheap money’ and profligate state spending, which therefore 
required that states tighten their belts.118 
Indeed, as with previous crises, the crisis of the mid 2000s allowed for new ideas 
to influence policy responses to it. Unlike the paradigm shift represented by the change 
from Keynesian to neoliberal economic policies (including the ordoliberal offshoot), 
here the ideas forming the cognitive filter served to reinforce existing preconceptions 
regarding the role of the state in economic policy. From the work of Reinhart and Rogoff 
that dominated policy circles in the US, in which it was argued that accumulation of 
public sector debt resulted in decline in growth,119 to that of the ‘Bocconi Boys’ in Milan 
who argued for ‘expansionary austerity’ as a means to counter financial crisis,120 
prominent economically liberal thinkers were able to successfully argue that the 
perceived crisis was a crisis fuelled by public sector debts and deficits, a fact then 
recognised by policymakers, resulting in the facilitation of new legal changes. 
According to Blyth, the Bocconi University of Milan public finance economics 
thinking began with the work of Luigi Einaudi in the early twentieth century, as a hybrid 
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of the Ordoliberal school of economic liberalism and public choice economics.121 The 
role of the state, according to this way of thinking, is to expand the boundaries of the 
market, facilitate competition and create ‘the legal and political milieu in which men can 
organise, invent and produce’.122 Blyth argues that it is a new generation of economics 
professors at Bocconi, such as Alberto Alesina and Francesco Silvia Ardagna, who have 
substantially influenced the EU’s current policies, and subsequent law reforms, in light 
of the crisis.123 Austerity, namely the cutting of public expenditure, would allow for 
economic expansion as the private sector moves to fill the gap, their line of thinking 
runs. Instead of raising taxes, or taking on more debt in order to facilitate public works 
programmes and ensure employment, as the Keynesian consensus argued in the mid-
twentieth century, states should instead ‘combine spending cuts in transfers, welfare 
programs and the governmental wage bill’.124 
This can be seen most clearly in the case of Greece, as well as in Ireland, Italy, 
Spain and Portugal. Despite criticisms over the methodology and strength of their 
findings that led to state reforms based in cutting budgets,125 and indeed the entire 
concept of ‘expansionary austerity’,126 the work of Alesina and Ardagna was presented 
at a 2010 ECOFIN meeting in Madrid, and was highly influential on the European 
Central Bank, resulting in their support of state budgetary cuts.127 In the media, as well 
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as the corridors of power in Berlin and Brussels, the Greek case in particular was 
presented as one which consisted of a lazy and bloated public sector, incredible 
inefficiencies and an overly generous state pension system, all made possible as a result 
of successive Greek governments having easy access to capital because of membership 
of the Euro,128 rather than as the result of significant macroeconomic imbalances and 
structural faults within the Euro monetary system itself. The European Commission, 
European Central Bank and International Monetary Fund, known as the Troika, 
implemented a system to ‘bail out’ Greece, as the financial markets were unwilling to do 
so. With a budget deficit of 13 per cent and debts of 120 per cent of GDP, within the 
monetarist system dominating economic thought since the Bretton Woods collapse, the 
Greek state was not considered credible or creditworthy. However, the bailouts given to 
Greece and the other ‘debtor’ states came with ‘strict conditionality’. This conditionality 
was required with Germany as the ‘indispensable nation’,129 with scholars agreeing that 
‘German power, interests and ideas would be crucial in determining whether EMU 
would fail, continue to muddle through or be put on a more sustainable path’.130 Rather 
than focus on systemic reform, including the fabled ‘eurobonds’, which would allow 
investors to grant money to the Eurobloc as a whole, which would then apportion it to 
individual states requiring financial aid, Germany instead focused on structural 
adjustments to individual countries, within a narrative frame in which the countries of 
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Northern Europe were prudential saints, and Southern Europe, profligate sinners.131 
According to Merkel, there was no alternative. ‘The rules must not be oriented toward 
the weak, but toward the strong. That is a hard message. But it is an economic 
necessity.’132 As with the creation of the price stability rules in the Growth and Stability 
Pact, however, it is one thing for something to be necessary; it is another to ensure that 
there is no legal alternative. 
The first set of legal changes was the ‘Six Pack’ of laws passed in 2011. The Six 
Pack comprised three Regulations133 and one Directive134 intended to increase 
compliance with the Stability and Growth Pack Requirements, and two Regulations 
intended to ensure the prevention of macroeconomic imbalances and enforcement 
actions to ‘correct’ excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the Euro area.135 In 2013, 
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two further Regulations136 were passed, which provided for closer budgetary scrutiny 
and coordination. According to Chalmers, this legislation serves to hem in states ‘with a 
hedgerow of constraints and procedures’137 based on the identification of the public 
goods of ‘low debt, balanced budgets and balanced economic performance’.138 In other 
words, economic policies based on an ideology of market liberalism and monetarism 
become codified as legally binding obligations, ensuring that, while competing economic 
visions may contest the use of these measures as a way of securing both the exit from 
‘crisis’ as well as growth post-crisis, it is not possible to pursue such action. While there 
may be alternatives that could be pursued by national governments, there is no legal 
alternative. 
These obligations, imposed during a time of perceived crisis, then facilitate a 
permanent legal change, in which the state of emergency becomes the ‘normal’ of legal 
provisions, requiring that this budgetary surveillance and compliance remains post-
crisis, resulting in a permanent reconfiguration of the state. Law acts therefore as both 
Ideological State Apparatus (ISA) and Repressive State Apparatus (RSA) in these 
circumstances – law is an ISA, as the rule-of-law narrative requires that ‘good’ states 
abide by their legal obligations, as do their citizens. Acting in direct contravention of 
those laws becomes socially unacceptable and politically infeasible. To do so would 
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somehow delegitimise the actions taken – while they may have been effective they are 
nevertheless illegal, and therefore unthinkable in a constitutional system based upon 
the rule of law. As an RSA, the attachment of bailouts to strict conditionality gives law a 
coercive force; do this, or there will be penalties. Your legal requirement is to obey, and 
your punishment for you failing to do so is legally enforceable sanctions. 
Let us return then to the notion of strict conditionality. The bailouts, and the 
attached conditionality, have been commented upon by Kilpatrick for their somewhat 
unusual legal nature – carried out by EU institutions, and yet not based directly on EU 
law, instead relying upon Memoranda of Understanding to ensure cuts to specific 
sectors or budgetary fields.139 These bailouts have required strict structural reform, 
including ‘extensive cuts to, or limitations upon who can access, health and education 
provision; reduced access to and levels of pensions and other social benefits . . . and 
reduced employment protection’.140 In other words, this process of state 
transformation, based on the legal implementation of economic ideology, has resulted in 
the burden falling disproportionately on the poor, the vulnerable, the disabled, and the 
young. 
And what of the consequences? As was discussed with regard to the events of the 
1970s, what began as an economic crisis became increasingly perceived as a legitimacy 
crisis, caused by undue amounts of ‘democracy’ represented by the influence of actors 
such as trade unions in determining state economic policies. As a result, we saw a move 
to the regulatory market state, and more ‘technocratic’ modes of governance replacing 
government. We can consider that the events of the past few years have led to a repeat 
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of the 1970s, with a twist; economic crisis begets legitimacy crisis, but in this instance, it 
is a crisis of the existing model based in technocratic governance. The philosopher 
Ulrich Beck wrote that there were risks to ‘German Europe’, reflected by the hegemony 
of German economic thinking and policy direction during the height of the crisis. This, 
according to Beck, creates division not just between Northern states and Southern 
states, but also between elected and electorate. In Beck’s words, ‘Governments vote for 
austerity measures, while people vote against them. What [this] reveals is the structural 
divide between a European project that has been devised and administered from above, 
by political and economic elites, and the resistance that wells up from below.’141 The 
EU’s move to halt the crisis through unpopular economic adjustments mandated by 
(and in turn justified by reference to) legislation reinforced a perception that the EU 
and its legal order was disconnected from the people of Europe, making life-changing 
decisions in a dispassionate, unrepresentative way. Gillingham argues that ‘the gap 
between the elitist approaches of the ruling Eurocrats and the democratic consensus 
needed for political legitimacy is huge’.142 In 2014 this resulted in a wave of 
nominations of ‘anti-EU’ and Eurosceptic parties to the European Parliament, as well as 
dramatic drops in support for the European project in Southern European states subject 
to the ‘expansionary austerity’ doctrine.143 
Indeed, there is a growing body of literature that refers to the end of the EU as 
we know it; the crisis represents the end of the Eurocrats’ dream,144 the consideration 
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that European integration has gone too far,145 and indeed, that the EU deserves an 
obituary.146 What is not considered, however, is that it is perhaps not the EU that needs 
an obituary, but the way in which integration has been pursued, namely through a 
technocratic ‘rules and markets’ approach. This is the basis for the legitimacy crisis. 
Whereas previously, democracy was perceived by expert groups as being detrimental to 
economic development, resulting in top-down restructuring of state relations through 
the imposition of neo/ordoliberal economic doctrine as binding legal obligations, this 
legitimacy crisis is of those binding legal obligations, and the manner in which they are 
imposed. According to Nicoli, based on a large-scale quantitative analysis of 
parliamentary elections throughout the EU Member States between 2008 and 2015, the 
economic crisis has led to a rise in the election of populist, anti-EU parties, ‘particularly 
through the channel of negative growth, historically high levels of unemployment and 
governance arrangements’.147 Interestingly, the results were found to pervade beyond 
both the Southern states directly subject to the externally imposed austerity measures, 
and even to countries outside of the EMU.148 This goes beyond a simple left–right divide, 
as Innerarity argues, but instead results in a ‘technocracy–populism’ axis being added to 
the traditional political compass, which straddles both the left and right of the political 
spectrum.149 This can be seen in the left-populist revolt against further proposed 
austerity measures in the 2015 pyrrhic referendum in Greece, in which voters said ‘Oxi’ 
(no) to the Troika and further cuts to the public sector, which were nevertheless 
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implemented by the defeated Syriza government. It can be seen as part of the large ‘NO’ 
vote that characterised the Italian constitutional referendum of December 2016, in 
which 60 per cent of the electorate refused a massive constitutional reform presented 
by mainstream politics as the natural ‘European choice’.150 It can also be seen in the 
(albeit fringe) ‘Lexit’ movement in the UK, which campaigned for leaving the EU on the 
grounds that the legal framework of EU law prevented progressive economic 
reforms.151 More visibly, and arguably much more effectively, a populist right-wing 
rhetoric concerning the technocracy of the EU, its lack of legitimacy and its 
responsibility for worsening economic crises struck a chord with the British public. 
Michael Gove, a leading figure in the ‘Brexit’ movement, famously responded to an 
audience member at a Sky News debate on the merits of leaving the EU, ‘people in this 
country have had enough of experts’.152 According to Travers, the decision by British 
voters to leave the EU can be attributed to various factors, including immigration (i.e. 
the free movement of workers, particularly as a form of competition for low-skilled jobs 
perceived as facilitating a race to the bottom in terms of wages and conditions); a 
narrative of bureaucrats disconnected from the interests of the population imposing 
top-down regulation; a dislike of austerity; and a perception that the crisis in the 
Eurozone was having a negative impact on the British economy.153 Several academic 
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commentators, writing soon after the result was announced, have indicated concerns 
that this perception of an out-of-touch elite, coupled with a perceived failure of 
‘expansionary austerity’ as public services have been cut, unemployment has risen and 
people have expressed publicly a desire to ‘take back control’, has led to a situation 
where populist ideas are serving to delegitimise the functions of the EU, and indeed the 
current regulatory framework.154 Prime Minister Theresa May’s comments and 
subsequent support for a ‘hard’ Brexit, on the grounds that ‘no deal is better than a bad 
deal’, further reinforces that where policy choices and ideologies are crystallised in the 
form of binding obligations, the perceived solution to their rigidity is to remove oneself 
from that system of regulation altogether. It should be of concern to policymakers that 
when a framework is created in which There is No Legal Alternative, alternatives to that 
legal system begin to be sought. 
Conclusion(s) 
The central thesis of this chapter has been that ideas matter. We have argued that the 
way we look at structural challenges and the solutions we offer are ultimately based on 
our perception of material facts filtered through the shaping lenses of ideas and 
ideologies. We have discussed throughout the chapter how the Euro-crisis has been 
shaped and analysed largely as a debt and budget deficits crisis in which virtuous actors 
have had to bear the costs of sloppy partners, who in turn needed to pay their 
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benefactors back. What has been largely missing from this mainstream narrative is an 
acknowledgement that different analyses and, indeed, alternative solutions exist. In this 
sense, the Euro-crisis is very much a perceived crisis and therefore, we have argued, 
ideologically biased in its perception. Our thesis is that this is essentially the net result 
of the integration process as carried out since the 1970s. In particular it is in the double 
move from Keynesian to liberal economics on the one hand, and from state politics to 
supranational technocracy on the other, that we find the inception of the move from 
‘there is no alternative’, as a powerful economic and political discourse, to the definitive 
‘there is no legal alternative’ by which, regardless of their existence, alternative analysis 
and solutions are not simply intellectually disregarded, but effectively made illegal. The 
Euro-crisis is in this sense the symptom of a much larger or (to borrow the words of this 
book’s title) multi-systemic failure. Both actors and commentators have gone to a great 
deal of effort to shape the surrounding narrative as a failure delimited both theoretically 
(debt and deficit) and geographically (Greece and Southern Europe). 
Yet what this narrative has failed to appreciate is the fact that ideas matter. 
Eventually a contestation between competing ideas is bound to emerge in a situation of 
structural conflict and uncertainty, such as the one pervading the EU as of the late 
2000s. When this happens, if there is no legal alternative within the polity, competing 
narratives may very well identify solutions outside the polity. It is no surprise then that 
the controversial (Greece), unwisely packaged (Italy) or altogether shattering (UK) 
referendums held in the last two years have been essentially a net rejection of the 
dominant narrative and of its legal authority (albeit with very different connotations as 
discussed above). 
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In this sense, the codification of ideology into law constitutes a major grounding 
element of a multi-systemic failure of which the Euro-crisis is, in the end, but an 
epiphenomenon. 
